Notes of Drama A
Fate, Freedom, and the Tragic Experience: An Introductory Lecture on Sophocles's Oedipus the King
Introduction
This week we are discussing one
of the world's most famous plays, Sophocles's Oedipus the King, and my purpose
here is to offer a general introduction to this famous and often puzzling work,
which, from the time of the Classical Greeks, has set the standard for a form
of literature we call dramatic tragedy. I shall be addressing that claim in
some detail later on, but before getting to that or to the text of the play
itself, I would like to clarify a couple of terms which are going to be crucial
parts of the interpretative remarks I have to offer. In this preliminary part
of the lecture, I shall attempt to link what goes on in this play to other
works we have studied (or will be studying).
The lecture thus falls into
three parts: first, an initial discussion of some terms I wish to use
(particularly the terms fate and hero), then an application of those terms to
what we see going on in Oedipus the King, and finally, building on these two
concerns, I would like to address the terms tragedy and tragic vision of
experience.
Fate, Fatalism, A Fatalistic
World View
In Sophocles's play, as in
other works we have read, we encounter an obviously important notion, the role
played by fate or the fates. The emphasis placed on these words (and sometimes
the personalities representing them) gives to the stories and the vision of
life they hold up something we might call a fatalistic quality. What exactly
does this mean? What does a text mean when it invokes the concept of fate?
Now, almost everyone will offer
a definition of this quality, but it's surprising how those definitions can
often differ. So let me attempt to clarify what, for the purposes of this
lecture and beyond, I understand by these important terms.
To invoke the concept of fate
or to have a fatalistic vision of experience is, simply put, to claim that the
most important forces which create, shape, guide, reward, and afflict human
life are out of human control. There is something else out there (where exactly
varies from one vision to the next) which, in effect, sets and controls the
rules of our lives, determining most or all things of particular importance to
us: our good and bad fortune, our happiness and sorrow, and, above all, our
death. To have a fatalistic sense of life is to hold that in this game of life,
the rules, the flow of play, the success or failure of my team (and my
contribution to that), and so on are out of the control of any human being or
collection of human beings. The outcome and all the various stages of the game
are determined from non-human sources.
The terms fate and fatalistic
do assert, however, that something or someone is in control, and hence the
universe does not operate by chance. We
may have little to no accurate idea of why fate works the way it does (although
differing fatalistic vision will provide different senses of just how much we
can know and deal with fate), but at least there is something out there
controlling what goes on. To assert that
chance rules all things (as Jocasta does in the play) is to claim that there is
little we can do to control things and nothing we can learn about it, since the
concept of chance suggests that what occurs is quite arbitrary, unrelated to
any higher system of order or meaning.
All these points are clear
enough, but it is important to insist upon them, because (as I shall mention
later) such fatalism is, in many ways, profoundly different from what we
believe nowadays, and thus books which hold up a fatalistic view of life (and
that includes almost all books up until the eighteenth century) can provide
difficulties for us, especially since a fatalistic view of life in some ways
challenges some of our most cherished beliefs and can make us profoundly
uncomfortable (a factor which is, of course, something which can make such
books uniquely valuable to us).
If we hold a fatalistic world
view or believe in fate, it is not uncommon to give that fate a name or series
of names, that is, to provide some way of talking about or picturing such fatal
forces. Hence arises (according to many scholars of myth) the entire concept of
divinity or a divine family—superhuman personalities (who may or may not have
human forms and attributes) who control the rules and the events of our lives
according to their own principles, which may or may not be intelligible to us
(more about that later).
For instance, it's clear that
the visions of life in Gilgamesh and the Old Testament, for all their
differences, are fatalistic in the sense I have described. Ultimate control
over human life is exercised by non-human forces or personalities. The human
beings who believe these fatalistic visions have names for such controlling
figures. In the Old Testament there is only one such fatal figure; in
Gilgamesh, as in the Greek epics, there are numerous controlling figures. But
the principle is the same: our lives are not in our own hands.
Giving fate a name or series of
names is a necessary imaginative act, for it permits the human subject to such
fate to understand his situation. Such a symbolic construct makes the most
important features of human life emotionally intelligible, allowing us to explain
and generally to accept the game we are all in, even if we are conscious that
we did not choose it and can imagine a better one. It also permits us in the
process to establish a relationship with the controlling forces of our
existence. Such a relationship often forms the basis for personal or communal
religious practices, especially if I believe that such fatal presences do
listen and can sometimes be persuaded by prayer, sacrifice, penitence, and so
on.
Let me give you a personal
example. A few years my son was killed very unexpectedly. At once, I, like
everyone else, searched for an explanation. Why did this disaster have to
happen? What in this best of all possible worlds could justify such an
unwelcome event? And after reading all the police reports and talking to
countless people, I could come up with only one explanation: The Lord giveth
and the Lord taketh away. Blessed be the name of the Lord.
Now, I'm not a particularly
religious person. But that explanation (as unsatisfactory as many may find it)
was enormously consoling. My son died because that's what fate, destiny, the
Lord, or whatever one chooses to call it, had so determined. The event was not
simply fortuitous, inexplicable. I could put a name and a personality on the
disaster. I might not have been able to come up with a clear human reason, but
I could at least make that event emotionally intelligible to me within the
framework of a supportable belief system.
It's important at this stage to
stress what such a fatalistic world view does not mean (or not necessarily
mean). To call a world view fatalist or to believe in fate is not necessarily
to characterize that fate as having any particular form. So, for example, a
fatalistic world view might be extremely pessimistic, seeking in the non-human
forces an irrational and often malignant force or personality which has little
love for human beings and who takes a great delight in human suffering and
death (or who, at least, permits it without much scruple). Alternatively, a
fatalistic world view might well hold that the controlling forces or
personalities of the cosmos are, on the whole, benevolent and friendly and
that, if I attend carefully to what they demand, I may lead a generally
satisfying life, perhaps even going on to some eternal happiness in the life
hereafter. Such conflicting visions are both equally fatalistic, for they both
share the sense that there is no human control over the rules and no method
humans can devise for changing such rules. But they differ profoundly on how
they view such fatal rules, the first being much more pessimistic than the
second.
Another important point to note
in discussing fatalism or a fatalistic view of life is that it does not
therefore mean that human beings have no freedom. This point is crucial. The
fates (or the gods, if I characterize my fatalistic vision in that manner) may
indeed control all the rules and determine the good and bad things that happen
to me, including my own death. But I am free to adopt towards that fate
whatever attitude I choose. In other words, how I confront my fate is my free
choice, the way in which I exercise my human freedom.
This point, indeed, should be
clear enough after a reading of Exodus or Gilgamesh. For the key element in
both books is an education in the appropriate stance towards the fatal
conditions of life, something over which the people in the stories have
complete freedom. God may control the world and the future of the Israelites,
but they have freedom whether or not they believe in him. And that story shows
us the great difficulty the Israelites, in their freedom in the desert,
experience in maintaining the faith. God promises to reward them or their
descendants if they believe, He gives them all sorts of demonstrations of His
power, He punishes those who break faith and the rules which demonstrate that
faith, but He does not determine their belief: they are free not to believe.
Similarly in Gilgamesh, the hero goes through an extensive education before he
freely chooses to accept his fate, return to Uruk, and live his life in the
full and free acceptance of how the world operates. Gilgamesh has the freedom not to return,
after all.
I stress this point about the
importance of free will in a fatalistic universe, because it's the key to
understanding most of the ancient stores we read. The quality of being human,
in such stories, comes, not from the extent to which the hero controls his own
destiny or fate (which is ultimately in the hands of other forces), but from
the attitude(s) he adopts in the face of a fatal destiny.
[To appreciate the point one
has only to think about a modern sports hero, whose greatness derives not from
changing the rules or inventing a new game or whatever, but from operating
within the given structure of the game, over which he has no control. What he
does control is his own effort and attitude to what is going on. A sports figure who whines all the time about
the unfairness of the rules is of little interest.]
For many of you I have been
re-stating the obvious. However, for some here this concept of fatalism may
seem rather odd or at least strange. For we North Americans (particularly those
on the West Coast who are not Natives) are, in many respects the least
fatalistic of people, and we spend most of our lives either denying the entire
concept of a fatalistic vision of experience or trying hard to forget it. And
we do that because we are heirs to a tradition, now about two hundred years
old, which has attempted to deny the existence of fate in the old-fashioned
sense I have been outlining above and to insist, by contrast, that human beings
must be encouraged to take control over their own lives, to make their own
rules, and where necessary to fight and conquer the given conditions of life,
which are not fatal divine presences but human problems, capable of human
solutions. We have all enlisted in the
fight against Humbaba, the divine monster in Gilgamesh and our most cherished
cultural belief is that we can and will eventually win.
We, in other words, have been
trying to take control of the game of life, to reshape it to our own purposes,
and to deny the existence of some greater powers over which we have no control.
We have done this by launching a massive project to assault as much of nature
as we can, so as to bring it under human control, so that we are no longer
victims of casual changes in climate, bacterial infections, harvest failures,
natural disasters. And we have been, in many quarters, so spectacularly
successful that we are encouraged to think that we have only a short route to
go before we become, as the saying has it, masters of our own fate.
This point is clear enough if
you think for a moment about how everyone in here carries a clear fate, and no
one has to have a religious sensibility to accept it. That is, each of us
carries a biological destiny in our genes, something which, it seems clear, is
going to control a great deal of what happens to us, no matter what we do. But
most of us here are aware that we are assaulting that genetic destiny with a
vengeance, so as to gain control of it, to subsume the mystery of our
biological fate under human rational control. And many of us are extremely
confident that once that victory is complete, we will have gained a significant
victory over fate, putting human life, and perhaps even that strongest reminder
of our fate, our death, into our own hands.
This two-hundred year old
project has been accompanied by a general hostility to fatalistic ways of
looking at the world (religious and otherwise), because any notion of fatalism,
the sense that the controlling forces of the world are much more mysterious and
powerful than we can imagine is an uncomfortable reminder that we may be
deluding ourselves about our own powers, that what we are up against may be a
great deal more complex and unknowable than we can imagine. Severe natural
disasters or new outbreaks of massive lethal epidemics and similar occurrences
are often unpleasant reminders that, even if we don't like to think about fate,
we may not have put our fates as much under our control as we might wish. This
very play, Sophocles's Oedipus the King, some have argued, is making precisely
that point (I'll come back to this idea later).
The Hero
If we grasp something about the
basic notion of a fatalistic universe (which is, as I say, fundamental to
almost all traditional stories), then we can see why the principal character in
many traditional stories has a unique importance. It's not simply a matter that
the hero is very successful (although he often is) or that he he carries out
deeds which no one else can carry out (although he frequently does just that).
The hero is more likely to be someone who confronts fate in a very personal
manner and whose reaction to that encounter serves to illuminate for us our own
particular condition.
Most of us, after all, live in
a community where we don't have to think about the implications of a fatalistic
vision of the universe very much because our social group has educated us in a
particular way of understanding the world and has provided, in addition to that
education, all sorts of stories, rituals, institutions, and so on to reinforce
our common approach to experience. We are all, to a great degree, creatures of habit
in this respect. And so we don't constantly explore the basis for our belief or
(if we stay more or less within our community) have to cope with any challenge
to it.
The story of a hero who
challenges or encounters fate and has to respond (particularly outside the
community, physically or psychologically) can force us to confront some basic
truths about life and about how what we like to believe rests on some
fundamental assumptions. That can happen (and often does happen) even if the
vision of fate which the hero has to deal with is quite strange to us. For the
basic questions about life which a fatalistic vision of life raises transcend
the particular details of that vision.
Let me explain. Many of us no
longer believe in the Lord of the Old Testament, and we would be unlikely to
sign on with Moses in his journey through the wilderness. But when we read that
story, we have to confront a challenge: Who does control our lives? What sort
of relationship do we have to that divine force? Does an acknowledgement of a
fatal divine presence impose any moral obligations on me relative to my fellow
believers? And so on. Moses gives us a vision of a particular answer to such
questions. We don't have to share it in order for these questions to register
as important and challenging. We may well prefer not to have to think about
them most of the time. But if we are reading the Old Testament imaginatively,
we can scarcely avoid them. And what comes out of that collision does not
depend upon whether or not I share the faith of Moses in the Lord and the
Lord's promise to His people's historical destiny (although the reader's
evaluation of his response will certainly be different if he is a believer or a
non-believer).
Similarly, I don't have to
believe in the panoply of gods in Gilgamesh to sense that this is a fatalistic
universe, that the hero's conduct forces him to confront his awareness of and
attitude to the fates which control his destiny, and that his various responses
(which go from ignoring fate, to challenging it, to accepting it) raise some
serious issues for me.
[Incidentally, to digress for a
moment, in this business, there's an important difference between someone we
call a hero and someone we call a celebrity. The latter is someone who is very
successful within the context of the social group, who has become well known
because of his skill in existing within a particular set of rules, without
having to question those rules. A hero, by contrast, is someone who confronts
issues beyond the social rules, who encounters (often by a long physical
journey) the fundamental conditions of life itself and who thus comes to some
understanding, as Moses and Gilgamesh do, of the relationship between the way
the world runs and the social group which bases itself on a shared community
understanding. Celebrities, if you like, show us that our society can produce
worldly success; heroes help us understand the reasons why our society works
the way it does. Heroes, especially traditional heroes, are usually (often
invariably) also celebrities, like Moses, Gilgamesh, and Oedipus. But heroes
don't have to be celebrities (like Socrates).
Because heroes explore the
roots of their society's beliefs (rather than just exploiting them), their
stories will often be particularly illuminating about the particular cultural
values of their communities. To understand why Moses is such a great hero
(when, for example, he is in many ways unlike heroes from other cultures) is to
understand a great deal about why the Israelites behave the way they do. To
understand why Gilgamesh is such a great hero is to understand some things that
lie at the heart of the vision of fate which Gilgamesh illuminates for us. To
compare Moses and Gilgamesh as heroic characters is to come to an understanding
of some of the fundamental differences between two famous and imaginatively
moving fatalistic visions very different from our own understanding of the
world.
The most significant feature of
a traditional hero in comparison with the others in his community is his
willingness to act, to make decisions (usually in response to a crisis of some
kind), and to step forward and take risks in the face of fate at a time when
such decisions are necessary. In Greek
tragedies, nowhere more clearly than in Oedipus the King, this quality is what
separates the hero from the chorus. The
latter typically acknowledge their timidity or bewilderment or anxiety in the
face of the crisis and look to the hero for leadership, often placing their hopes
in the hero's record of previous successes.
They are followers and require someone to step out an assume the risks
of making decisions about what the community should do.
Oedipus the King: Some Initial
Observations
I would now like to establish
some preliminary observations (at first, some very obvious ones) about Oedipus
in order to establish, following some of the remarks I have made above, why we
can consider him a great hero and what his famous story reveals about the
vision of human life which this play illuminates for us.
Oedipus is, we recognize right
from the start, a great celebrity, a national leader of a city-state at a
moment of crisis. Thebes has been mysteriously attacked by the plague,
something which both Oedipus and the citizen see as a manifestation of the
fatal forces of the universe in which they live. The citizens are dying, and
they want, if possible, to stop the disaster. The future of their city depends
upon that. They naturally turn to
Oedipus, their firm and popular ruler.
The opening of the play makes
at least two things clear to us. First, the citizens have enormous respect,
even love, for Oedipus. They acknowledge not only his political power (which
they have given him), but also his pre-eminence among all human beings for
wisdom, especially in dealing with things they don't understand: "We judge
you/ the first of men in what happens in this life/and in our interactions with
the gods" (37-39). Second, we see in Oedipus a person of enormous
self-assurance and self-confidence, a man who is willing to take on full
responsibility for dealing with the crisis, a task which he clearly accepts as
his own unique challenge. Oedipus has, we observe right from the opening lines,
an enormously powerful sense of his own excellence, of his own worth (the most
obvious indication of this point, something worth attending to throughout the
entire play, is the frequency of the pronouns I and me in all of Oedipus's
utterances).
The opening also makes clear to
us that both the chorus's confidence in Oedipus and his strong sense of his own
worth derive from past experience. Oedipus has saved the city before, at a time
when many others had tried. And he did it with his mind, his intellect: he
solved the riddle of the Sphinx. So the opening speeches clearly establish a
harmonious relationship between ruler and ruled, based on past experience.
Oedipus's confidence is not, in other words, merely an illusion. He has an
exemplary record, the people have come to him because of that quality, and he
fully intends to live up to that standard. Yes, he has a high regard for
himself, but we are given to understand that that is quite deserved and shared
by those over whom he rules.
And his first steps to deal
with the crisis, that is, to send to the oracle for some instructions, are
entirely appropriate. Given that fate has brought on the plague, what can fate
reveal about its origins? Oedipus has, in fact, anticipated the request of the
priest: he has already acted on his own initiative to address the crisis. And
when the oracle's report is made public, Oedipus immediately and forcefully
proclaims his famous curse against the murderer of Laius, the previous king.
All this seems very appropriate. And, in fact, it does serve to reassure the
people. Their fears are calmed, because Oedipus, their king who saved them
before, is taking care of the problem.
At the same time, however, this
scene gives us our first sense of what becomes inescapable later on. Oedipus,
in accepting the responsibility, has no room for sharing the problem with
anyone else. As a measure of his own greatness, he will resolve Thebes's
distress, and he will do it openly for all to see. That's why he can dismiss
Creon's suggestion that he listen to the report about the oracle privately
first and why he can confidently declare "Then I will start afresh, and
once again/ shed light on darkness" (159). He is taking on the task as a
personal challenge, to be dealt with in his terms, not by delegating it to
someone else or, indeed, by discussing the matter with others or, as we shall
see, by listening to what others have to say and acting on their suggestions.
Oedipus's Self-Assertion
The quality I have just
referred to (Oedipus's determination to deal with the issues himself), hinted
at here in the opening scene, becomes increasingly evident as the play
progresses. Indeed, it becomes his most obvious characteristic—his will to see
this matter through on his own terms, no matter what the cost. And the more we
learn about the ironic net of facts which he is uncovering about the murder,
the more we see his determination grow. Even as he becomes increasingly aware
about his own possible implication in the death of Laius, his commitment to
finding an answer by himself remains strong.
This quality is the most
puzzling and most important feature of Oedipus's character, and we need to
appreciate it in order to understand both certain incidents in the play and the
effect the play has on us. For Oedipus is fundamentally different from the
heroes we have encountered so far. He is not like Moses, a man with hardly any
sense of his own magnificence, a man who sees himself first and foremost as a
servant of God charged with bringing religious and political discipline to his
community. Nor is he like Gilgamesh, a man capable of learning to listen to
others and finally to accept what they tell him about the nature of existence.
Oedipus is a fiercely self-assertive man throughout his story. He is, to put
the matter simply, a man who answers only to himself, to his image of his own
greatness. The fact that he is acting in the interests of Thebes and trying to
do the right thing (at least at first) doesn't alter this point at all. Oedipus
is trying to live up to a standard, but it is not a standard given to him by
God or one taught to him by others: the standard he answers to is the measure
he sets of his own greatness. So
prominent is this feature of his character, that we cannot separate out clearly
Oedipus's desire to help the city from his desire to manifest his own greatness. In his eyes (and those of the chorus), of
course, the two are identical.
For that reason, Oedipus has
very little political sense, and the play has no political dimension to it at
all. Creon seems to be the one with a political sensibility (where caution and
a sense of political outcomes matter). Oedipus does everything publicly, as if
hiding something would compromise his own greatness. He is Oedipus. He and
everyone else recognize his greatness. To practice duplicity or political
prudence would be to compromise his own sense of himself.
Oedipus and Teiresias
The most obvious indication of
Oedipus's total commitment to himself is the famous quarrel with Teiresias. To
some readers Oedipus's conduct here seems very odd, but this quarrel makes
perfect sense if we see Oedipus as someone with no sense of ambiguity in life,
as a person wedded to the view that his conception of what matters is, in fact,
the truth.
By that standard, Oedipus has
good reason to be angry with Teiresias and to suspect him. For Teiresias knows
the murderer of Laius and will not tell. Oedipus has absolutely no sense that
he might be involved at all. And since he has no conception of that as a
possibility, it cannot be true. Thus, when Teiresias announces to Oedipus that
"the accursed polluter of this land is you" (421), Oedipus's
interpretation is clear enough: Teiresias must be lying, and he must have a
reason, a secret agenda. A different man might well stop at this point, calm
down, and ask Teiresias what he meant. That is to say, a different man might
have stopped hanging onto his own certainties, confident that they were the
truth, and have listened carefully to what someone else had to say (as
Gilgamesh learns to do). But Oedipus is not that sort of person. In fact, rather than listen to Teiresias,
Oedipus reminds everyone of his previous triumph over the Sphinx (stressing
that Teiresias failed to help Thebes then)—he derives a sense of what is right
from who he is based on his past achievements, rather than from any more
flexible appreciation for more complex possibilities.
Many first-time readers of the
play are quick to criticize Oedipus here, to say that, in effect, he is too hot
tempered or proud or whatever. But it's important to remember that Oedipus has
every reason to be fully confident that he is not implicated in the murder of
Laius, as well as to be confident in his own abilities to get to the truth
(after all, he's done it before). True, he might be more cautious and polite
here, but if he had those qualities he almost certainly wouldn't be king of Thebes
in the first place or, if he were, he would be too prudent to launch the sort
of investigation he does.
This last point (to which I
shall return) is crucial to grasp. At the heart of Oedipus's greatness is an
enormous (and, as we learn, naïve) self-confidence. And we can be quick to
criticize that as a failing. But without this self-confidence, this absolute
trust in his own power to act decisively, publicly, and quickly, Oedipus would
be like the Chorus, impotent in the face of the crisis, looking around for
someone to take charge. The very things that we might find lacking in his
character are the very things that enable him to step up to the front, make
decisions, and act to meet the crisis (and eventually, let us remember, to deal
with it, since he does find the murderer of Laius and cleanse the city of
plague).
The Chorus and Other Characters
The contrast between Oedipus
and the Chorus, very prominent in a stage production, is perhaps less evident
to a reader. But it's important to note
just how incapable they are of acting decisively. They want something done, but they are all
too aware of their own limitations, their fear in the face of the unknown,
typically addressing their fates with acknowledgements of their own terror or
fearful questions:
My fearful heart twists on the rack and
shakes with fear.
O Delian healer, for whom we
cry aloud
in holy awe, what
obligation
will you demand from me, a thing
unknown
or now renewed with the
revolving years?
Immortal voice, O child of
golden Hope,
speak to
me! (185-191)
The Choral utterances are
reminders of what we might call a normal response to experience—hesitation,
fears, hopes, questions. They want to
believe in the benevolence of their gods, but they know all too well that that
may not be there. Confronting their
fates with such feelings, naturally they lack the assertive self-confidence to
do anything significant at the time of crisis, and they look to Oedipus to take
actions because they not only have no idea what to do but lack the
self-confidence to do anything.
Oedipus's treatment of
Teiresias and Creon concerns the Chorus, and they make some attempt to calm
things down, recognizing that Oedipus's quick judgment may be leading him to
misjudge what Creon and Teiresias are saying.
But they will not abandon or criticize Oedipus because they understand
that if some decisive action needs to be taken, he's the only one who can do
it.
They certainly cannot expect
Creon to tackle the problem head on.
After all, he makes it clear to everyone (including the readers) that
he's primarily a cautious political operator, happy to play that game as second
fiddle, with no desire to manifest his own excellence to the full. One gets the distinct sense that if Creon
were in charge of the investigation into the plague, he would (like so many
college administrators) appoints a series of committees to meet behind closed
doors to talk the problem away if possible.
And Jocasta clearly wants the
whole matter just to go away. She has
precisely the wrong advice for Oedipus (not that he would listen to anyone's
advice anyway) when she advises him to cease his investigation into his fate
because there's no such thing, inviting him to live his life for the moment:
Why should a man whose life seems ruled
by chance
live in fear—a man who never looks ahead,
who has no certain vision of his future.
It’s best to live haphazardly, as best
one can. (1161-1164)
What she's doing here, of
course, is inviting Oedipus to be someone else, someone who has no concern for
living up to his reputation for knowledge and courage. And, of course, Oedipus doesn't listen to
her, just as he doesn't listen to anyone else.
One needs to measure Oedipus's
stature against the other characters in the play, taking into account his
capacity for decisive action in comparison to their inaction or unwillingness
to think through the need for action.
Whatever one might like to say by way of criticizing Oedipus, that point
remains.
The Irony of Oedipus's Story:
The Interplay of Fate and Free Will
What makes Oedipus's actions in
this quarrel with Teiresias and throughout the play so dramatically compelling
and increasingly tense is that we, the readers, know the outcome of the story.
That is, we are familiar with Oedipus's fate. And yet there's no sense during
the story that Oedipus is compelled to act the way he does: he freely chooses
to initiate the chain of events which eventually reveals his fate to him. In
that sense, the interplay between Oedipus's sense of his own freedom and our
sense of his eventual outcome constitutes the main dramatic power in the play
(for there's no suspense about the outcome of a story which is so well known to
the audience before they arrive at the theatre or pick up the text to read it).
Oedipus has spent all his life
dealing with his fate. He has, we learn, been told that he is fated to kill his
father and marry his mother. And he has refused to accept that fate. He has
spent much of his life moving around, so as to avoid his fate. In other words,
he has freely chosen, for reasons which we can surely understand and applaud,
to construct a life in which what he has been told will happen will not happen.
And, so far as he can tell, he
has been spectacularly successful. In doing what he has done, Oedipus has
gained (he thinks) the knowledge that a man does not have to meekly accept an
unwelcome fate, and one, moreover, which is morally abhorrent to him and to the
play's audience. He can take efforts to change the direction assigned to his
life. This fact, once again, gives him powerful reasons for feeling very
confident in his own abilities to deal with the mysterious powers which control
the world. In his own mind, he is a human being who has thwarted his fate
(although he is still very worried that it might eventually happen).
We, of course, know otherwise.
So throughout the play there is a powerful sense of irony at work, an irony
which manifests itself in the growing discrepancy between what Oedipus thinks
is the case and what we know to be the case. We understand why he sees the
world and himself the way he does (and we can applaud him for that). At the
same time, we know he is wrong. He is deceived about his relationship to the
world. In that sense, he is blind (a really important metaphor here).
[As an aside, one might observe
that the very name Oedipus, which means either swollen foot or knowledge of
one's feet or both, is a constant reminder of this ironic tension. Here the
greatest of men, famous for his insight into the mysteries of life, is blind to
the significance of his own name, an obvious clue to his past.]
The ironic tension builds as
the play goes on, of course. The clues about the real murderer accumulate, yet
Oedipus persists in believing he cannot be the one, even though he remembers
killing a man at a road junction. And so, in his ignorance he redoubles his
efforts, resisting all urges from Jocasta, his wife, to abandon the
investigation. For Oedipus finding the truth becomes something of an obsession:
he has to see this matter through, because that's the sort of man he is.
Finding the truth is far more important than what that truth might reveal.
Hence, what we witness here is
a strongly pessimistic vision of fate: here we have the best of men, the most
knowledgeable, the most successful, and, in many ways, the best intentioned,
who sets out to save his own city. And in a very fundamental way Oedipus is
entirely innocent. He has done nothing
by any standard of conventional morality to merit such a fate. But even such a man, for all his excellence
and past success, cannot know enough about what fate is really like to
recognize what it has in store for him. The truth of what he is and what he has
done is even worse than he can possible imagine. And the course of events which
leads him to discover the truth about himself has been freely initiated and
maintained throughout by himself.
The vision of life here is very
mysterious and very cruel. Even the best and most innocent of men, it seems to
say, one who has striven to live the best life possible and who endures to find
out the truth of who he really is and what his life really amounts to will be
horrified to learn the truth. Fate has not established a reasonable covenant
here with some clear rules and a happier future (as in Exodus), nor does fate
offer a secure and valued life in the community (as in Gilgamesh), nor is there
any sense that Oedipus's fate is linked to some sin he has committed. Here fate
punishes arbitrarily and mercilessly those who choose to confront the mystery.
Oedipus as a Tragic Hero
It is time now to turn to a
term which I have deliberately kept out of the discussion until this point, the
word tragedy and its corollaries tragic hero and tragic vision. But now, having
considered very cursorily some of the major points about Oedipus the King, I
would like to introduce it in order to amplify the discussion of the play and
to place that in a wider context.
Oedipus's story, I have argued,
focuses our attention on a very particular heroic character, one who insists
upon acting according to his own vision of experience, who persists freely in
the course of action he has initiated, brushing aside or shouting down the
objections or alternative suggestions of other people. He imposes on his life
his own views of what he thinks is right, refusing to attend to what others are
saying (he insists on agreement, rather than listening to others and weighing
what they tell him). Oedipus, in his
freedom, sets in motion a chain of events for which he accepts full
responsibility and, even as disaster looms, he continues as before, not
flinching or assigning blame or tasks to anyone else.
It's worth noting that, even
when he learns the horrific truth of his life, Oedipus himself takes on the
full responsibility for his own punishment. First, he stabs out his own eyes
and then he insists on banishment. At no time in the play does he compromise:
what needs to be done is what he decides needs to be done. And even in the face
of the disastrous truth, Oedipus does not bend or break or start asking advice.
He will act decisively until the very end.
In this respect, Oedipus stands
in marked contrast to Gilgamesh, who, in response to the death of Enkidu is
placed in a similar situation and for similar reasons—he thought he knew all
there was to know about life. But Gilgamesh learns from that experience and
changes. His behaviour towards others undergoes a significant transformation,
and he comes back to Uruk at the end of the story a changed personality.
Oedipus remains at the end of the play, for all the total reversal of his
fortune, still the self-assertive man exercising full free control over his own
life. If he is going to suffer, then he will determine what form that suffering
will take.
Oedipus, of course, is more
than just a particular character: he is also a character type. In fact, his
story helps to define a certain heroic response to experience which we call
tragic, and this play is commonly hailed as our greatest dramatic tragedy.
While Sophocles's Oedipus is by no means our first tragic hero, he is certainly
the most famous (outside of Shakespeare) and hence has exerted a decisive
influence on literature in the West. Thus, I would like to spend a few moments
looking at the general characteristics of his character, indicating how these
help us to understand what we mean by a tragic hero (as opposed to other kinds
of heroes), and then suggesting some observations about the vision of life which
such a tragic hero exemplifies.
One major component in
Oedipus's personality which helps to define him as a character we label as
tragic is his attitude towards fate. Rather than aligning himself with it (as
Moses does) or learning through experience to accept the mystery of fate (as
Gilgamesh does) Oedipus chooses to defy fate. He will make his own decisions in
his own way, and he will live with the consequences those bring. He will answer
to his own sense of himself, rather than shape his life in accordance with
someone else's set of rules or an awareness of something bigger and more
important than himself. That's true of Oedipus at the start of the play, and
he's doing the same thing at the end. At no point is he willing to compromise.
He is, if you like, a man
totally committed to his own freedom to be what he thinks he must be, to live
up to his own conception of heroic greatness. If there is an obstacle in the
way (like Teiresias, for example), then that obstacle must be forcibly
removed—it interferes with his sense of what's going on. Oedipus makes no
effort to conceal what he is feeling or to hesitate about acting on those
feelings. Why should he? After all, he is Oedipus, whose greatness manifests
itself in being entirely true to itself, without duplicity.
Obviously he has an enormous
ego—the central purpose of his life is to assert that sense of himself. With
this powerful ego comes a certain narrowness of vision, which has no room for
alternative opinions or dissenting views, and often a very powerfully assertive
voice (dominated, as I have observed, by the pronouns I and me). But (and this
is crucial) he is also prepared to accept any and all the consequences of his
actions. That, too, is a measure of his greatness. The Chorus at the end of the
play (like the reader) may blame fate or the gods or the impossible demands of
life. Oedipus does not. He remains the master of what happens to him. The
responsibility is his, and what happens to him is entirely up to him.
We need to remember that he is
always in a sense the chief architect of what is happening to him. What
underscores the irony I referred to earlier is that the Oedipus is dealing with
a situation in which he is increasingly having to cope with circumstances
initiated by his own decisions. This last point is an essential one. What makes
Oedipus so compelling is not that he suffers horribly and endures at the end an
almost living death (a great many other non-tragic heroes suffer wretchedly).
The force of the play comes from the connection between Oedipus's sufferings
and his own freely chosen actions, that is, from our awareness of how he
himself is bringing upon his own head the dreadful outcome. His freely chosen
decisions are (we know) bringing things closer and closer to an inevitable conclusion.
Looking forward in the play we can see that Oedipus is free to go in different
directions; in that sense he is not compelled to do what he does. Looking back over the action from the
conclusion of the play, we can see a link of inevitable consequences arising
from the hero's free decisions.
This is an important point
because in common language we often use the term tragic or tragedy as a loose
synonym for terrible, pathetic, or horrible (e.g., a tragic accident). But
strictly speaking in a literary sense, true accidents are never tragic, because
they are accidents; they occur by chance. What makes Sophoclean tragedy so
moving is the step-by-step link between the hero's own decisions throughout the
play and the disaster which awaits. As Aristotle points out, Sophoclean tragedy
works, in part, through this sense of inevitability. Oedipus is doomed, mainly
because he is the sort of person he is. Someone else, someone with a very
different character, would not have suffered Oedipus's life. They would have compromised their sense of
freedom in the name of prudence, custom, politics, or survival.
Such a powerfully egoistic
character is entirely different from someone like, say, Moses, who sees his
life in terms of service to the Lord and the community of Israelites (there's
little sense that Moses has anything we might call an ego) or like Gilgamesh,
who is prepared to wander adrift throughout the world looking for answers and
learning from others so that he accepts limitations on own sense of personal freedom.
Moses and Gilgamesh both suffer a great deal, but they learn from that
suffering and encourage others to do so. Oedipus learns that he has been
horribly wrong about life, but that does not induce him to change, or beg
forgiveness, or transpose the blame onto someone else or seek to put his life
on a different footing.
And the effects of the stories
are quite different. Moses's story serves to confirm the validity of the
existing social order, to endorse the vision of social order which the Lord has
passed down to His people through Moses. Yes, Moses dies, but he has lived a
full life and is in sight of the promised land, which his people will reach
very soon. And Gilgamesh's story (like the Odyssey) confirms the social order
of the community (particularly as that is enshrined by relationships with
women) as the very centre of the good life.
Oedipus's story has a different
effect. Because of what he has done, we have been given a privileged glimpse
into the ineluctable mysteriousness and malignancy of fate. Here the social
order is not confirmed as an eternal decree of fate: it is, by contrast,
exposed as something of an illusion. The story of Oedipus, that is, offers us
no consolation that what we believe about the order of the world or the
benevolence of the ruling powers or the eternal rightness of our ways of
dealing with them bears any relationship to what they are really like. In that
sense it is a much more disturbing narrative (more about that later).
Further Observations on the
Tragic Hero
If we take a step back from the
story of Oedipus for a moment, we might want to ask ourselves this question:
What is the point of telling such a story, or, more interestingly perhaps, why
would we ever celebrate such a vision of life? This question is all the more
compelling for us because the tragic hero and the vision of life his story
holds up for us are something unique to the West, an inheritance passed onto us
by the Greeks, something profoundly at odds with most of our religious
sensibilities.
Put another way, we might
wonder what there is to admire in a character like Oedipus, who confronts the
world with a heroic self-assertion so strong that he will never compromise with
social custom, prudence, or political strategy—not even when his own survival is
at stake. Why should we admire a character who is willing to endure so much
rather than to swerve from his self-directed course, even when that leads him
to disaster?
The answer to such questions is
very complex and much contested, and I can offer only a general indication. But
I think it has something to do with our cultural obsession with personal
freedom and integrity. For Oedipus (and tragic characters based on a similar
vision of life) see life primarily in terms of these two qualities: freedom and
integrity. So strong is their sense of the importance of these qualities that
they simply ignore all the things which most of us do to remain in a stable
well-functioning community, that is, to adjust our sense of our integrity and
what we demand out of life to the demands of living in a community, limiting
our desires and shaping our identity under certain pressures to conform.
Sophocles's play forces us to
confront the disturbing reality about such an attitude: this ultimate
expression of my own freedom to express myself, to demand from the world that
it answer to me rather than the other way around, leads by a step-by-step
process to inevitable destruction. For the fates that rule the cosmos are
powerful and mysterious, and we have no right to assume that they are friendly.
The human being who sets himself up to live life only on his own terms, as the
totally free expressions of his own will, is going to come to a
self-destructive end. However grand and imaginatively appealing the tragic
stance might be, it is essentially an act of defiance against the gods (or
whoever rules the cosmos) and will push the tragic hero to an series of actions
(which he initiates in the full sense of his own freedom) culminating in
destruction. We cannot live life entirely on our own terms for very long. We
may think we can, but Oedipus is a reminder of the consequences. Fate is so
much more powerful, complex, and hostile than we can possible imagine it, no
matter what our consoling social narratives tell us.
By way of underscoring the
nature of the tragic hero, consider for a moment some different varieties of
heroic conduct. In many narratives, the hero, like Oedipus, faces a critical
situation. But he deals with them in a very different manner—by trickery,
disguise, cooperative action, for example (Odysseus is the great example from
Greek narratives of such flexible conduct). In Moses's case, his actions are
determined, not by self-initiated assertions of a powerful ego declaring its
own preeminence, but by following instructions of the Lord on behalf the people
(and he has to learn to trust the Lord and even go against his own sense of his
abilities in order to serve). Gilgamesh becomes a mature leader only because he
is capable of learning to move beyond the assertions of his ego, to acquire
humility and an acceptance of his community's values.
In all such cases, the emphasis
is very strongly on getting back to the community or hanging onto the community
at all costs—the hero will do whatever is necessary within the framework of a
shared belief system. And his greatness is measured by his success at
confirming the importance of that belief system. To do so, the heroes must
frequently compromise or hide their identity or undergo humbling experiences or
admit they have been wrong, and so on. Once they display these characteristics,
such heroes return home to a sense of continuity and happiness (hence, the
frequent ending to such stories: "They lived happily ever after").
Such heroes we generally refer to as comic heroes, a term which does not mean
necessarily that they are funny but rather that the ending of their stories is
a celebration of community values, most often dramatically exemplified in the
final dance (the komos).
The tragic hero, by contrast,
rarely if ever displays such intellectual and emotional flexibility. He doesn't
(in his mind) need to, since the purpose of his life is to live it openly on
his own terms. And he ends his story with self-destruction, usually a
self-chosen death (or suicide) because the only alternative to destruction (or
self-destruction) is compromise, something he will not (or cannot) do. True,
Oedipus does not die at the end of the story. But in a sense he is dead, moving
out into the waste lands, beyond the community where he has created that sense
of his own greatness. There is certainly no sense at the end of the play that
Oedipus has anything to look forward to except death. In most of the plays we call tragedies the
death is physical.
[Parenthetically, we might note
here that it's not entirely clear at the end of the play whether Oedipus
returns to the palace or stumbles out into the wilderness beyond the city. We know from the full Oedipus story that he
eventually wandered out into the wilderness (as he wishes to do), but there are
suggestions in the play that Creon is going to wait before allowing him to do
that. However, there is no doubt that
having Oedipus wander off away from the palace is the more dramatically
compelling ending].
The Appeal of Tragedy
Let me try to explore the differences
I have briefly referred to above in another way, using the terminology of an
interpreter of the comic and tragic experience, Murray Krieger. Krieger
observes that most of us live in communities and that these communities are
governed by shared rules of conduct, ethical norms. These ethical norms
constitute limits beyond which we do not go, for fear of either fracturing the
community or endangering ourselves. Thus, we are all in a sense ethical human
beings. We usually keep our disputes and desires and assertions of the self
within certain limits, resolving differences of opinion in accordance with
procedures and institutions we have set up to deal with them. Such rules may be
given to us in our traditions, by our religion, or by a shared rational agreement,
or by all three. And we set up civic institutions to ratify this shared social
code (courts, churches, schools, legislatures). All around us we place
reminders so that we recognize them and act on them. And should we be forced,
by circumstance, to recognize that we have become somehow displaced from the
community (as Odysseus or Gilgamesh is geographically during his adventures),
we strive as hard as possible to get back, to recover the communal joy and
security of living within the limits.
Now, acting in accordance with
these ethical rules always requires, Krieger observes, certain compromises. We
cannot be or do all that we might want, simply because the full range of human
possibilities includes things which transgress the limits, the ethical norms
upon which the community depends. Thus, an important part of being an ethical
member of the community is to control ourselves and, if necessary, to educate
ourselves, so that we act within the limits set by the community.
Now, it is clear that in this
sense Odysseus and the mature Gilgamesh and Moses are ethical human beings.
They do not challenge the basic rules set up for the community; in fact, their
survival depends upon recognizing and using those rules. Moses and Odysseus get
upset when certain life forms, like the Cyclopes, or certain people, like the
rebelling Israelites, do not observe the limits of civilized living. Odysseus
is constantly battling bad luck and the various challenges that nature is
placing in his way, but he never loses faith in, let alone challenges, the most
important shared rules of the community. The same is true of Moses. Both
Odysseus and Moses may be displaced from society, outside the community or in
the business of creating a community, but they want to get back in, because
they believe in and endorse what communal living stands for. At the end of the
Odyssey, for example, Odysseus and his rivals are prepared to compromise (under
the orders of Athena), to end their conflict, in order to achieve tranquility
on which the community depends. Gilgamesh is willing to move beyond the loss of
Enkidu and his earlier identity and to celebrate the walls of Uruk.
But Oedipus is quite different.
He is acting in the interests of the community, but his primary motivation does
not come from any sense of ethical propriety or accepted norms of behaviour. He
answers only to himself, and he is not willing to compromise his quest for the
truth in the name of any social principle which others, like Creon or Jocasta,
may offer, because to do so would be to violate his sense of himself. In that
sense, he is like Job throughout most of Job's story: the only answer he will
accept is one from god. Like Job, Oedipus is extraordinarily stubborn,
resisting any pleas for moderation or limits on his own desires for life on his
terms. The main difference between Job
and Oedipus, of course, is that when fate reveals itself, Job bows down before
it; Oedipus continues to defy it to the end.
This feature of the tragic hero
as exemplified in Oedipus makes the tragic character a great paradox. For
unlike most of us, the tragic hero emerges as anything but a social person. He
apparently may begin that way, seemingly motivated by a genuine desire to help
the community, as Oedipus and Job both do, but what emerges in the course of
the action is that he is actually, deep down where it really counts, far more
concerned with his own sense of himself, his own demands for justice on his own
terms, than in compromising his desires with any awareness of ethical norms. He
is, in fact, far less concerned about his own survival in the community than he
is about being right, seeing things through to the very end.
What is there about such a
character that commands our admiration? Why have we in the West placed such a
high value on this sort of behaviour? For from one perspective tragic heroes,
like Oedipus, are anything but attractive. They are usually very stubborn,
egocentric, humourless, relentlessly convinced of their own rectitude, quick
tempered, and unswerving in their pursuit of truth as they see it, with no room
for those who would persuade them otherwise. These are not people whom one
would, at first sight, like to invite to dinner or have as next-door neighbours
or in-laws (Odysseus, Gilgamesh, or Moses, one senses, would be much better
candidates for a social occasion).
And it's true that many people
find the stance of the tragic hero unacceptable. Obviously, anyone who believes
that certain ethical norms are laws of nature will find the tragic hero's
stance simply idiotic—an vain egotistical posturing for self-glorification in
defiance of the established truth of things. So it's not surprising that people
who believe in the rational progress of human society will have no sympathy for
tragedy. Walt Whitman, for example, the great democrat, expressed the views
that America had no place for Shakespearean tragedy, and the first Commissar
for Education in the Soviet Union, Lunacharsky, said much the same about the
new communist state.
To admire the tragic character
requires, not that we like him particularly, but rather that we see in his
response to experience something magnificently heroic, an unwillingness to
accept any shared understanding of experience, a refusal to compromise with any
one else's answer as to what life is all about, a determination to push life
beyond all simple ethical explanations and to discover for himself the full
meaning of experience (that may not be his original intention, as I say, but as
the story unfolds that becomes increasingly manifest). If that desire leads to
self-destruction, as it usually does, then that is the price the hero is
willing to pay. It's not that the tragic hero necessarily sets out with that
goal in mind. But somewhere in the course of his adventures he is faced with a
choice: compromise or continue on your own terms. The comic hero, I have
suggested, is the one who compromises for survival and a safe return. The
tragic hero is the one to chooses not to compromise for the sake of continuing
on his own terms, even if that means he will soon come to a nasty ending.
The really puzzling question is
this: Why do some people make that choice not to compromise. How do we arrive
at a sympathetic understanding of such a radically individualistic stance?
There is no way to do so, short of witnessing it in some way. For the tragic
stance is profoundly irrational. It stems from something deep inside some
people, and has to do with the way they feel about themselves and about life.
Most of us, I take it, are not tragic by nature. We are ethical citizens,
compromising all the time with our desires to push life's envelope in order to
achieve a secure cooperative life in the community. But imaginatively we can
see in the tragic hero the courage and resolution of someone who is not
prepared to compromise and who is prepared to endure terribly through life and
to accept an early death as the price one must pay to live life entirely on
one's own terms. To the extent that the tragic figure represents some ultimate
possibility of human striving and achievement, we honour it, even if we cannot
find adequate rational reasons for conferring communal worth upon it. A culture
which values personal freedom and integrity will see in the tragic hero the
ultimate symbol of those values.
What I am referring to is
summed up in the famous dictum of Horace Walpole: Comedy is for the person who
thinks, tragedy for the person who feels. A thinking person, wedded to some
rational communal understanding of life, will often find no sense to the tragic
stance, since it seems to violate all that community life demands from the
individual in the name of joy, security, and justice. Only if I feel within me an
emotionally imaginative contact with the tragic hero can it "mean"
anything to me.
Krieger puts it this way. As
human beings, he says, we have two basic urges—first, to survive in the
community and to live on in our family and its descendants, and second, to have
our individual life mean something, to have our integrity, our sense of
ourselves as unique individuals uncontaminated with any compromise, count for
something which endures. Comedy, Krieger argues, is the literary form
celebrating the first impulse; tragedy the literary form celebrating the
second. In comedy we are prepared to compromise our human individuality in
order to secure a life in the enduring community. In tragedy the hero is
prepared to sacrifice everything in order to guarantee his integrity.
That is one reason perhaps why
comedy, for all its celebration and fun at the end, its sense of a community
happily restored to a meaningful ethical way of life which will provide purpose
to life, often contains within in a sense of defeat. There is something
unwelcome to some people about that famous conclusion, "And lived happily
ever after." For comedy inevitably involves a turning away from ultimate
questions about the full importance of an individual life and settling for a
significance provided by the community's shared values, even when we think (as
we may do) that those values are not true or do not answer to everything we
might like to achieve for ourselves.
That sense of a let down may
also be the clue to one of our most intriguing characters in literature: the
clown with the broken heart (Pagliacci, Rigoletto, Feste, Red Skelton, Tony
Hancock, and others), the figure who has turned away from any final
confrontation with the mystery of life and has devoted his energies to
celebrating the joys that are possible in the community, in the full awareness
of their illusory nature. We celebrate the fun, because the alternative is too
dangerous to contemplate or endure.
Tragedy, by contrast, for all
the pain and suffering the hero goes through, often brings with it a sense of
triumph, at least to the extent that we have witnessed a possibility of the
human spirit which is not prepared to define life by the limits imposed by the
community and its shared rule-bound expectations. The tragic hero is a reminder
that there are those who are prepared to tear apart the comforting illusions of
cosmic order and justice by which we live in our communities, who have the
courage to demand from life the truth of things, even if that truth is
uncomfortable, as it surely is in Sophocles, or devastatingly pessimistic as it
is in Euripides.
That sense of triumph is
frequently accompanied by a sense of unease. After all, in tragedy we are
celebrating the possibility of a human spirit's moving into uncharted territory
in which our well loved social values stand revealed for what they may well be:
illusions which we like to believe are the truth but which may be quite wrong.
For example, it is common to
observe that Oedipus the King may well be a prophetic insight into the nature
of our human confidence in our ability to confront fate. Perhaps we, in our
scientific confidence, in the optimistic spirit with which we think we can deal
with fate, may turn out to be like Oedipus, going up against something much
more mysterious and complex and malignant than we can imagine. I don't want to
push this interpretation here, but such an approach to the play might well help
to generate some unease about the self-assertive confidence with which we
declare our own superiority over fate and seek to solve all questions with
those tools which seem to have served us so well in the past, our intelligence
and daring. Do we even fully understand our own swollen feet?
Interpreting Tragedy
The tragic vision is
particularly difficult to interpret, partly because it can be so difficult to
accept the vision of the cosmos which it reveals. If the story of the tragic
hero is a moving artistic reminder of the extent to which the universe is
neither comforting nor rationally just, no matter how much we might like to
think so, then as viewers or as readers it is striking at some of those things
we most like to believe about the world.
Hence, we often try to moralize
the tragic experience away. We try to convert the story of Oedipus from that of
a supremely gifted and heroic individual who takes on life on his own terms and
discovers the full mysterious destructiveness of the cosmos into a comforting
morality story which tells us that Oedipus suffers because he sinned. If only
he hadn't been so arrogant or so irascible or so egotistical or belligerent
when confronted by his father and his entourage, or whatever, he would have
been all right.
This approach to Oedipus or to
any Sophoclean tragedy is, of course, disastrous, because it entirely misses
the point. Of course, if Oedipus had been someone else, he wouldn't have ended
up the way he does. But then he would not be the great person he is either.
When we interpret the play in that way, we are like Job's comforters, trying to
fit a painful and complex human situation into a moral straight jacket where we
can understand it easily and without discomfort.
Oedipus suffers because he is a
great human being. Yes, he makes an error, but it is his greatness as a human
being which leads him into this error. That word error is important. It comes
from Aristotle's concept of hamartia, that characteristic of the tragic hero
which leads to his destruction. This phrase is often translated as "tragic
flaw." And that translation has unfortunately encouraged the moralizing
tendency, because the word "flaw" suggests some corrigible moral
error, some sin, which he shouldn't have done.
The word "error" is
more useful, I think, because it is closer to the Sophoclean idea that the
tragic hero initiates his own downfall, not because he is somehow a sinner, but
rather because he is so excellent, so capable, so confident of his powers, and
so brave that he will take on the consequences. His error is inextricably tied
up with his human greatness. If he were a lesser human being, like Creon, he
would not suffer the way he does. But then he would not have the tragic
greatness Oedipus manifests either.
Putting it another way, we can
say Oedipus is capable of doing what he does because he is uniquely brave,
excellent, and intelligent. But the tragedy reminds us that even the best and
the bravest, those famous throughout the world for their knowledge, are doomed
if they set themselves up against the mystery of life itself, and if they try
to force life to answer to them, they are going to self-destruct. His error, if
that is the word we must use, is not sin but ignorance, and he is ignorant of
what he is up against because he is a human being. Even the very best of us,
the ones with most reason to be confident of our powers of understanding, have
no idea what fate is really like, what it has in store.
(One might briefly mention at
this point that Oedipus is frequently interpreted as an allegory for the Athens
Sophocles lived in, a city which, like Oedipus, is heading for total destruction
because of its amazing achievements. The play is thus not a warning that Athens
ought to behave differently but rather a tragic vision of the inevitability of
Athens's decline and self-destruction. Others, as I have mentioned, following
the same allegorizing tendency, have seen in Oedipus the story of western
civilization, especially the story of its confidence in its own powers to shape
nature and make it answer to its own conceptions).
This desire to moralize the
tragic experience is understandable perhaps, but it takes the human mystery out
of this complex vision of experience. It's true there are many stories called
tragedies, especially from the middle ages, which see punishment for sin as the
main point of the play. Whether we should call these tragedies or not I'm not
going to discuss. But I want to insist that they are fundamentally different
from what Sophocles is presenting in his play.
That is one reason why so many
people find the end of Job something unsatisfying. For Job's stance throughout
most of his story is very close to that of a Sophoclean tragic hero
(comparisons between Job and Oedipus are frequent). But Job does not push his
demands on the cosmos to the limit. When he comes to his recognition of the
truth of the universe, he bows in acquiescence to it. That experience does not
shatter him. Quite the reverse, it leads to great material and emotional
rewards, and thus to a sense of comic closure. When the chips are down, Job
does what Gilgamesh does: he bows down before the fates which rule the world,
aligning his desires with theirs.
For the same reason, the tragic
vision evaporates if we believe that there is some life after death, if, that
is, the life of the hero is not over and that his death is simply the door to a
future life in heaven or elsewhere. What gives the tragic story so much power
is the notion that whatever human life is about, that significance ends with
death. To add something about "living happily or unhappily ever
after" is to take away that sense of a final ending upon which our
admiration for tragic heroism depends. If you think about it, there's a
significant difference between someone like Oedipus and, say, a Christian
martyr who suffers horribly in the name of a faith shared by a community of
Christians and who goes onto an eternal reward. The conduct may be heroic and
the suffering just as intense on a physical level, but it is not in the same
Sophoclean sense tragic, since individual existence is not over. And the promise of the reward in an afterlife
clearly endorses rather than challenges the ethical norms by which the martyr
lived and died.. Hence all traditional orthodox Christian views of life cannot
be tragic but are inherently comic (a divine comedy).
Parenthetically, it's
interesting to observe that although most of Shakespeare's comedies take place
in a recognizably Christian community, when he comes to write tragedies, he
generally (but not exclusively) prefers to shift the time of the play to a
pagan or pre-Christian epoch. Thus, the sense of a Christian afterlife does not
enter into the vision of life held up by the play.
The End of the Tragedy
By way of emphasizing some of
the points I have been considering, let me briefly mention another point: how
dramatic comedies and tragedies end. Dramatic comedies typically end with some
communal celebration, especially of those things most closely associated with
the survival of the community: betrothals, weddings, christening, a family
feast and dance, from which the evil forces have been excluded (either because
they have been exiled, killed, punished, or have reformed). The end of the
(non-satiric) comedy thus becomes an enthusiastic endorsement of the ethical
norms (often newly reconstituted) which ensure community stability.
The tragic drama, in Sophocles
especially, tends to end, not with the death of the hero, but with the
community's reflections upon the significance of the life which has just come
to an end. In this respect Oedipus is unusual, since he is not dead (although
his blindness and his expulsion from the human community indicates that his
life in Thebes as a leading citizen is, in effect, over). The tragic hero's
death (real or living death) also invites a community celebration, but it tends
to be something much more muted, the community's attempts to come to terms with
what the hero's story reveals about how the cosmos really works.
The carrying out of the corpse,
traditionally the final episode in a tragedy, is thus a reconstituting of the
community, but not in a way that emphasizes the joyful fun of community
standards. Rather, the citizens are united by a new awareness of the mystery of
life, something they, in their daily lives, rarely think about and never
discover for themselves. It is given only to the greatest of heroes to take on
the intense spiritual journey, and the conclusion of the tragedy, especially in
Sophocles, typically confers upon this extraordinary individual the awed
respect of a community which has benefited from his willingness to live life to
the extreme (even if the reasons for that respect are very hard to explain
rationally). They may not know exactly what to make of the experience (for the
full tragic sense resists easy moral summation), but they are intensely aware
of having been given a glimpse into something truly moving, something beyond
the veil of more comforting ethical norms.
So while we wait to see that final day,
we cannot call a mortal being happy
before he’s passed beyond life free from
pain. (1812-1814)
Postscript: Some Observations
on the Historical Development of Tragic Drama
In seeking to elucidate the
meaning of the term tragic drama we might usefully consider a few historical
facts, starting with the point that tragic dramas started as those plays the
Athenians put on in the Great Festival of Tragic Drama held at the annual
religious festival in honour of the god Dionysus. Writers and actors were
commissioned to take part in a competition, and prizes were awarded for the
first, second, and third prize. Leading citizens were strongly encouraged to
pay for the production.
The festival of tragic drama
offered works which focused upon the life, suffering, and death of a great
hero, usually one associated with the mythological past--Oedipus, Medea,
Xerxes, Agamemnon, Ajax, Achilles, and so on. The audience was invited to
witness the depiction and the celebration in art of the culminating event in a
great hero or heroine's life, usually the struggle that ended with the main
character's death and the community's reflection on that death.
Now, historians of literature,
from Aristotle onwards, have for a long time been puzzled about why such a form
of drama would emerge in the first place. This is all the more curious, since
tragedy is not a form of drama found elsewhere. Unlike comedy, which we can see
arising in many different cultures often in very similar ways, tragic drama
seems to have been unique to Greece, and tragic drama is one of the most
distinctively western traditions passed down to us.
So far as we can tell, tragic
drama began in Athens sometime in the sixth century with an actor called
Thespis. According to Aristotle's account (in the Poetics) originally a tragic
drama consisted of a single actor and a large chorus. This feature suggests
that tragic drama began as a choral celebration in memory of a dead hero in
which someone, probably the leader of the chorus, at some point began to act
out the exploits of the person being celebrated. That is, the leader of the
chorus took on the role of the dead hero (thus making the celebration dramatic,
since for drama to occur someone must pretend to be someone else, take on the
role of a different character). Gradually, it seems, the number of actors
increased. Aristotle tells us that Aeschylus was the first to introduce a second
actor, Sophocles the first to introduce the third actor, and by the time of
Euripides it is clear that the number of main actors has increased, and the
importance of the massive chorus has decreased.
What should have led the
Athenians to this unique form of drama is hard to figure out. Some historians
have sought a clue in the word tragedy, which seems etymologically to have
something to do with tragos, a goat. We know that the first actors clothed
themselves in a goat's skin and that the goat was associated with Dionysus, the
god at whose festival the tragedies were performed. But beyond that,
speculation takes over. One critic has observed that tragedies are like goats,
all hairy in front and bald behind. I offer that definition for whatever use you
can make of it.
I don't propose here to survey
the various theories that have been proposed as explaining the origin of this
form of drama, except to observe that the celebration of the famous hero at the
culminating point of his or her life may well have something to do with the
Athenians' central concern with human excellence as it manifests itself in
competition. For the tragic figure is, above all else, one who engages in the
most dangerous and challenging of competitions, the struggle to assert one's
human individuality to the fullest possible extent in the face of the most
intractable opponent, the very nature of life itself--a subject first explored
in Homer's Iliad, a source book for many Greek dramatic tragedies.
It is important to note that
from the start the Athenians associated tragic drama with an important
religious festival. For them, whatever took place in the experience of
witnessing a tragedy was central to the religious life of the community. And
the fiercely competitive nature of the contest and the esteem given to the
winning playwright also indicate that tragic drama was for them a vital part of
the community life.
The later history of tragedy is
a complex business. As one can imagine, the tragic vision of experience (as
exemplified in Sophocles) is not compatible with the much more optimistic
fatalism of Christianity, with its emphasis on the good life as one of faith,
hope, and charity within the Christian community and an eternity of joy or
punishment afterwards. Many Christian writers used the term tragedy for
relatively simple morality plays in which tragic figures were essentially great
sinners whose death reinforces Christian doctrine, something very different in
emphasis from Sophocles's vision.
In the Renaissance something
like the old vision reappears in the great tragedies of Shakespeare
(comparisons between Oedipus and King Lear, for example, are commonplace). But
once we reach the eighteenth century and the powerful appeal of the new
rational reforms of society and the aggressive agenda of the new science,
traditional tragic drama becomes harder to write and to sell to a public which
has little taste for such a challenge (for our culture is losing that sense of
fate on which classic tragedy depends, except in some new literary forms, like
the novel) and, with some important exceptions (notably Ibsen) tragic drama
loses its vitality as a continuing literary form or artistic vision.